John, I do not have the expertise to speak about the historical relationship between China and Tibet but remember what we read in the India papers in the late 50's/early 60's, when matters like the Dalai Lama seeking shelter in India to get out of China's grasp and the Indian-Chinese strained relationship after the debacle in the North-East were fresh events. Many in those days used to blame Nehru for being overly supine and accommodative towards China. His External Affairs Minister in those days, the acerbic V.K.Krishna Menon, and the erstwhile Indian ambassador in Peking (as it then was) K.M.Panikkar also shared in the blame. Both of them were known for their leftist leanings. K.M.Panikkar was much derided for his 'sophistry' in making a distinction between Chinese suzerainty and sovereignty over Tibet. The critics, who were mostly on the right, found fault with Nehru for carrying his anti-imperial rhetoric too far, being overly trustful of China and dropping his guard when dealing with China. They would point out that the British did not recognize that China had any special status in Tibet. Younghusband did not seek Chinese approval before entering Tibet in 1904. When the MacMahon Line was drawn at Simla in 1914, the Chinese were not invited and the Tibetan Delegation signed on it as an independent nation. Nehru did not use any of these strong points to keep Tibet out of China, as he considered the Simla Agreement as an imposition on a weak China in 1914. Events did emerge to justify some of this criticism. Forgetting all talk of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) and India's consistent support of China for getting a seat in the UNO, China tried to - and actually did - encroach upon Indian territory in Ladakh and the Northeast. After that, Nehru was a broken man and died soon afterwards, some say, as a result of it the Chinese perfidy. Krishna Menon, who was the Defence Minister when the Chinese came in, had to resign and was driven into political wilderness, as the Indian Army was found to be woefully unprepared against the Chinese. The border stalemate still smolders but I think both India and China have decided, as a matter of pragmatism, to let sleeping dogs lie for the foreseeable future. Defence preparedness-wise India is now in a far better position than in 1962 but does not want to waste its energy on re-acquiring territory 'in which not a blade of grass grows'. This is how Nehru had described Aksai-chin in the Parliament, a statement that would haunt him later and be remembered forever. Arvind Kolhatkar, Toronto, April 02, 2008.