The Times, Monday, Mar 26, 1866; pg. 12; Issue 25455; col E THE LOSS OF THE LONDON. - It cannot be denied that there is reason for dissatisfaction with the inquiry into the loss of the London and its result. The magistrate may have been strictly right in not permitting cross-examination, but no direct examination will ever bring out the whole truth, and satisfy the public that there is nothing to be cleared up. And from the habit of questioning witnesses very tenderly there is an indisposition even to ask them for explanations when their statements are incomprehensible. Several instances of this kind occurred in the inquiry into the loss of the London. The nautical witnesses gave most contradictory accounts of the same circumstance, but were seldom required to bring their statements into accord, or show the reason for their differences. As for the causes of the loss, we believe them to be very complex, and that we should err if we ascribed it solely to overlading, to structure, to deficiencies in equipment, to imprudent seamanship, or a badly composed crew. But all these causes had probably some part in the disaster. As for the lading, the ship certainly seems to have been brought down low in the water, but a steamer seldom leaves port in a perfect trim, for if she started light she would be crank after some days' consumption of fuel. So either at departure, or at arrival, the steamer can hardly be in the most desirable trim. But the deckload of fuel was certainly a fault, whether the total weight of the cargo was in excess or not. As for the structure of the ship, with a proportion of length to beam of nearly eight to one, we cannot but think it awkward for a ship intended for a long voyage, a great part of which would have to be performed under canvas. Mr. SAMUDA defends the proportions, and says they are those of the most successful steamers of the day; but are not those vessels for steam-power wholly, their handling under which will be very different from what it would be under sail? The very long ships under sail, and in bad weather with a heavy sea, will neither wear nor stay, and from those inabilities the Royal Charter was jammed on a lee-shore and lost, and previously, from the same causes, lower down the Channel, the Tayleure. A great effect has been produced by what we may describe as Mr. DENIS's posthumous evidence, the note in a bottle which drifted to Brest; but we must bear in mind that a landsman in a sinking ship may be excused for taking rather a harsh view of her qualities. We speak well of the bridge that carries us safe over, but not of the ship that takes us to the bottom. As for the seamanship, there is difference of opinion whether the ship ought to have been kept hove to, or run before the wind to shelter. But all nautical men must condemn her putting to sea in the depth of winter with all her top-gear aloft, and she must have been hove to the first time with royals on end and yards across, a most unseamanlike inconsistency. Mr. HIGHTON quotes the opinion of an old commander, that the ship should have been scudded. But the London had no proper storm sails, a great and culpable defect in her equipment, and if she had been furnished with them, we must ask whether fore and aft sails would have served her for running. If it would have been safe to put her before the wind at all, would it not have been under her reefed foretopsail? The "old commander" is wrong in stating that the small vessel which passed under the distressed London's stern, the Courier, scudded merrily before the gale. Not long after she left the London she was obliged to lie to. Mr. HIGHTON cites two contradictory statements as to the properties of the London, one in Mr. DENIS's note that she was crank, and another that she was so overweighted with cargo as to be too stiff to list from the wind. Had she been the latter her masts would inevitably have gone when she was lying to under sail, with her top-gear all aloft. The fact that the royals and topgallants were not lowered before bad weather was made we must attribute to the unfitness of the raw crew, unknown to each other and to their officers, and one-fourth or more foreigners, not understanding English words of command. - Examiner. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Petra