this is A Worcester (MA) Polytechnic Institute - Military Science - Army ROTC website American Antiquarian Society The American Antiquarian Society offers a wealth of historical resources, housing two-thirds of all primary source materials printed between 1640 and 1821. Their collection serves a worldwide community of students, teachers, historians, biographers, genealogists, and authors. American Antiquarian Society 185 Salisbury Street Worcester, MA 01609-1634 (508) 755-5221 http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/MilSci/BTSI/Hill/hill_pre.html Between June 13 - 15, the British planned to launch a coordinated attack on June 18 to secure Dorchester Heights. These seized and fortified, the British would pinch out Roxbury by converging attacks across the Dorchester and Boston necks. After establishing a fortified outpost there, they would make an amphibious landing on the Charlestown Peninsula and then drive the Americans from Cambridge. Executed with surprise, speed and determination, this plan easily could have been successful. Discovery of the redoubt on Breed's Hill changed the British priorities. They viewed the new fortification as both a threat and an opportunity. If allowed to consolidate their position on the Charlestown Peninsula and emplace heavy guns there, they could probably make Boston untenable for the British. However, these Americans on Breed's Hill appeared to be isolated, their defenses incomplete: A prompt counterattack should round up the lot of them, and might open up a chance of breaking up the Yankee Army. Disposition of Forces Prior to the Battle The following tables are taken from Elting's "The Battle of Bunker's Hill." Massachusetts Army, 17JUN1775 Colonel Regiment Date Certified Station Privates Gerrish, S 25 19MAY Cambridge 421 Learned, E 14 19MAY Roxbury Read, J 06 20MAY Roxbury Scammon, J 13 24MAY Cambridge 396 Thomas, J 02 26MAY Roxbury Ward, A 01 26MAY Cambridge 449 Gardner, T 15 26MAY Cambridge 425 Patterson, J 12 26MAY Cambridge 422 Prescott, W 09 26MAY Cambridge 456 Cotton, T 04 26MAY Roxbury Bridge, E 11 26MAY Cambridge 315 Whitcomb, A 05 26MAY Cambridge 470 Frye, J 10 26MAY Cambridge 493 Doolittle, E 18 26MAY Cambridge 308 Walker, T 03 26MAY Roxbury Danielson, T 08 26MAY Roxbury Mansfield, J 07 27MAY Cambridge 345 Fellows, J 17 29MAY Roxbury Nixon, J 16 02JUN Cambridge 224 Glover, J 23 07JUN Marblehead Heath, W 21 14JUN Roxbury Brewer, D 20 17JUN Roxbury Brewer, J 19 17JUN Cambridge 318 Woodbridge, B 22 18JUN Cambridge 242 Little, M 24 18JUN Cambridge 400 Gridley, R ART 18JUN Cambridge & Roxbury 370 Massachusetts Totals 6054 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- New Hampshire Army, 17JUN1775 Colonel Regiment Station Privates Stark, J 1 Medford 750 Poor, E 2 New Hampshire 486 Reed, J 3 West of Charlestown Neck 220 Sargent, P Lechmere's Point New Hampsire Totals 1456 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Connecticut Army, 17JUN1775 Colonel Regiment Station Privates Wooster, D 1 New York area Spencer, J 2 Roxbury/Cambridge 1000 Putnam, I 3 Cambridge 1000 Hinman, B 4 Ticonderoga Waterbury, D 5 New York area Parsons, S 6 New London/Camb 200 Connecticut Totals 1200 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Rhode Island Army, 17JUN1775 Colonel Station Privates Church, T Roxbury 500 Hitchcock, D Roxbury 500 Varnum, J Roxbury Rhode Island Totals 1000 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Approximate Combat Strength of a Typical Regiment Colony Organization Massachusetts Regiment of 10 companies, each of 3 officers and 56 enlisted men per company New Hampshire Similar to Massachusetts Connecticut Regiment of 10 companies of 100 men each Rhode Island 1500 man brigade of three regiments of eight companies each. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- British Forces in Boston Unit Strength Portion Engaged 4th Foot 290 Flank Companies 5th Foot 300 Entire Regiment 10th Foot 360 Flank Companies 23rd Foot 280 Flank Companies 35th Foot 450 Flank Companies 38th Foot 300 Entire Regiment 43rd Foot 300 Entire Regiment 47th Foot 280 Entire Regiment 49th Foot 450 Not Engaged 52nd Foot 300 Entire Regiment 59th Foot 230 Flank Companies 63rd Foot 450 Flank Companies 64th Foot 420 Not Engaged "Incorporated Companies" 270 Flank Companies Marines 1000 Both Battalions 17th Light Dragoons 196 Not Engaged Recruits 422 Not Engaged 4 Companies Artillery 144 Elements Total 6442 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Approximate Combat Strength of a Typical Regiment Personnel Quantity Cumulative Strength Effective Rank-and-File 280 280 Sergeants Present 28 308 Drummers Present 13 321 Officers Present 21 342 Sick, Confined, Furlough or Detached 49 293 Detached Flank Companies, Officers and Men 90 203 Pioneers, assigned to Artillery Company 3 200 Camp Guard Left in Boston 24 176 LTC, MAJ, Adjutant 3 173 Officers and men in 8 battalion companies 173 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Naval Forces Under Command of ADM Graves, as of 01JAN1775 Guns Ships 70 Asia, BOYNE* 64 SOMERSET* 50 PRESTON* 28 Tartar 20 Mercury, GLASGOW, Rose, Fowey, LIVELY, Scarborough (6 lbs) 18 SYMMETRY 9 lbs (Army) 16 Swan, Kingfisher, Tamer 14 FALCON 6 lbs 08 Canceaux, Savage, Cruizer 06 Diana, Hope, Magdalan, St. John, Gaspee, Halifax, Diligent, SPITFIRE(3 lbs, not commissioned) 02 2 gondolas with 2-12 lbs. (Army) Capitalized names are of ships in Boston harbor at the time of the seige. An asterix denotes the named ship was not actively engaged in the siege. A 20-gun ship was normally armed with 9-pounders, smaller ships with 6-pounders, and the larger vessels with 18- or 24-pounders. The effective range of an 18- or 24-pounder was over 1200 yards. Gunnery was so inaccurate, however, that these weapons posed little threat to an entrenched infantry several hundred yards inland. Starting Locations of Forces For reasons unknown, the rebels costructed their redoubt on Breed's Hill and not on Bunker's Hill, as originally planned. Breed's Hill measured only 60 feet in height, as compared to Bunker's 110 feet, and was closer to the eastern and southern shorelines, making it a target for artillery both offshore and in Boston. Breed's proximity to Boston also posed a more substantive threat to the British encamped in the town, ensuring their immediate retaliation. After construction of the redoubt, COL Prescot extended the defenses to the north by almost three hundred feet with the construction of breastworks. Colonels Knowlton and Stark were given the task of securing the American left flank, along the Mystic River. Knowlton added to a pre-existing stone wall which ran north to the beach. Stark extended the wall with wooden rails to the edge of the water. As the edges of the breastworks and stone wall did not meet, other men built fleches to plug the gap. With the addition of snipers in abandoned buildings in Charlestown, the Americans had created a line of defenders from 2500 - 4000 strong, depending on accounts. The British started in Boston, delayed in their attack by both the tide and a shortage of boats. General Gage's senior officer, General Howe, planned to move westward from Moulton's point, flank the redoubt on Breed's Hill, capture Bunker Hill and Charlestown Neck, and encircle the colonials. Action Seeing the newly constructed redoubt on Breed's Hill, the British began their advance by landing their infantry on the Charlestown Peninsula. The 5th and 38th Light Infantry proceeded from Long Wharf; in Boston, the 43rd, 57th and 47th Light Infantry moved in from North Battery. During this time, the British Navy supplied artillery fire from gunboats and ships offshore. GEN Howe landed at Morton's Point, north east of Breed's Hill, and advanced his columns along Mystic River beach, hoping to encircle the fortification and cut it off from reinforcements from the Cambridge area. The British advance was hampered by stone walls, which were difficult to see in the tall grass. Picking their way forward, Howe then saw Stark's newly constructed fence continuing the line of an existing stone wall to the edge of the Mystic River, effectively blocking Howe's proposed route. Howe also found difficulty moving his artillery through the marshy terrain. In addition to mobility problems, the cannon were found to be supplied with wrong sized shot. These events kept the effectiveness of the superior British artillery to a minimum. In preparation for the coming battle, Colonel Stark planted a wooden stake in the ground 35 yards from his men's position at the rail fence and stone wall. The defenders were instructed to fire as the advancing British crossed the line of the stake, to aim low, and to aim at British officers. In spite of some premature shots, as Howe's columns advanced to 35 yds from the stone fence, the majority of the rebels opened fire. While serving in the French and Indian War, Stark had learned the tactic of firing in ranks, as opposed to the more common practice of firing in a single unit volley. He used that technique here, decimating whole companies of British Light Infantry. The proximity and the sustained rate of the fire kept the British from mounting a bayonet charge. The Infantry survivors broke and ran, leaving 96 dead. The Grenadiers, delayed by broken terrain and stone fences hidden in the tall grass, then attacked, suffering the same fate as the Infantry. They fell back in disarray, leaving the beach soaked in blood. Regrouping quickly, Howe planned his second assault to use the same avenue of approach, turning left at the last moment to attack the fleches constructed north of the redoubt. Coordinated with Howe's attack was Pigot's assault directly on the redoubt. Howe was again repulsed hard, suffering horrible casualties. Understrength to begin with, regiments of 400 or so men were reduced to less than ten men each. Meanwhile, Pigot led the 38th and 43rd Light Infantry Regiments up the east side of the redoubt, while elements of the 47th Light Infantry, the Marines and six flank companies assailed the south. The fire from the fortification, similar in execution to the fire at the fence, halted the charge cold and sent the British back in disarray. Watching the battle from Boston, GEN Clinton, on his own initiative, led the last British reserves to Charlestown Peninsula. Howe then regrouped his shattered formations and planned his next move. He began to regard the rebels as an enemy army, not just a band of rabble. Having been repulsed twice in the same manner, Howe changed his tactics to counter the colonists' advantage. He ordered his men to drop their heavy packs and use only bayonets in the final charge. Thus, they could close more quickly, and would not waste time firing at the entrenched rebels. Howe was also able to employ his cannon, having been moved into position. The artillery fired grapeshot, to solve the problem of wrong sized shot, to both pin Stark's men at the rail fence to prevent them moving out, and to rake the breastworks of the redoubt. In the redoubt, many of Prescott's men had panicked and fled by this time. He had only 150 remaining, and was low on powder, shot and water. His men found themselves firing bits of stone and bent nails at the redcoats. Howe feinted the remnants of the 5th, the 52nd and the grenadiers toward the fence, and wheeled south to the north side of the redoubt. Pigot attacked the east side, and Pitcairn took the Marines and the rest of the 47th against the south. The Americans fired as the British entered close range, again inflicting withering losses. Their ammunition ran out, however, and the British closed with bayonets. The Americans, not supplied with close fighting weapons, fell back, taking most of their casualties at this time. Stark's men, retreating from the rail fence, prevented Prescott's men from being encircled. The retreat was carried out in good order preventing a rout. Outcome The Americans were forced to withdraw, but not before inflicting upon the British surprisingly heavy casualties. The revolution became a real war in the minds of Americans and British alike. Never again would the American rebels be treated as a third rate mob. The colonials had their first real taste of warfare in defense of their freedom. They found that the effectiveness of their fighting ability had been compromised by, among other factors, supply shortages, lack of discipline, and inter-colony rivalries. Lessons Learned Both armies had fought courageously and learned much. For the Redcoats, the lesson was painful. Although they had captured the hill, out of 2200 soldiers engaged, 1034 were casualties. The British attempted no further actions outside Boston for the next nine months. When Howe replaced Gage as military commander in America, the events of that day would continue to haunt him, and he would time and again fail to follow up a victory over the Americans. The Americans had shown they could stand up to the British in traditional open field combat. But where they had succeeded, it had been through individual gallantry rather than tactical planning or discipline. Some regiments had fought well, others not at all. Of an estimated 2500 to 4000 men engaged, 400 to 600 were casualties. Stronger leadership would be critical to success in further battles. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Rhonda Houston