William Washington, Cavalryman of the Revolution ? Stephen E. Haller. The story of the Revolutionary War in the Carolinas has been incomplete without a biography of Lt. Col. William Washington, cousin of George Washington. Washington distinguished himself as an infantry officer at Trenton (1776), but he transferred to the Continental Light Dragoons and served in the Middle States (1777-1779). He is best remembered as a cavalry commander in the South (1780-1781), where he fought in all of the major battles of Gen. Nathaniel Greene’s campaign to drive the British from the Carolinas. , The book compliments the biographies of several of Washington's fellow officers, including William Davie, Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee, Francis "Swamp Fox" Marion, Daniel Morgan and Thomas "Gamecock" Sumter -- as well as his primary British adversary, "Bloody" Banastre Tarleton. During the campaign in the Carolinas, General Nathaniel Greene once referred to "Light Horse Harry" Lee as his "eye," but he called Colonel Washington his "arm." Washington's military career is representative of the small, loyal cadre of key field officers who served with distinction in the Continental Army for the duration of the War. His six years in the war provide a first-hand view of the problems faced by the Americans in maintaining not only an army, but also particularly a cavalry corps. His story offers new insights on the traditional views of senior American generals George Washington, Nathaniel Greene and Horatio Gates regarding the cavalry's role in the war. Washington demonstrated his courage and tactical sense at Rugeley's Farm and Hammond Stores, and led decisive charges at Cowpens and Guilford Court House. His impetuous drive to bring an action to conclusion caused him trouble at Hobkirk's Hill and Eutaw Springs (where he was wounded and captured). A brief chronology of Washington's early life in Stafford County, Virginia and his later years in Charleston, South Carolina (including his romance with Jane Elliott and his political career), a bibliography, several illustrations and maps, and a full name index round out this story. 239 pp., illus., maps, paper The book was launched at the Cowpens National Battlefield in South Carolina on July 4, 2001 as part of the 225th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, and was described as "a lively, well-researched book that should delight historical-minded readers" in The State (South Carolina's largest newspaper). Stephen E. Haller is a professional archivist with twenty-five years experience. He is currently Manager of Archives and Records at Colonial Williamsburg Foundation in Virginia. He has been a life-long student of the American Revolution. -- For Revolutionary War information on the Internet, your first choice should be AMERICANREVOLUTION.ORG

I concur with Ed that this book fills a gap in the history of Rev War. Washington was a man of few words. Tarleton had his "Waxhaws"; Light Horse Harry Lee had his "Haw River", and Wm. Washington had his Hammond's Store. Unlike the others, Washington made no after-years defense of his "massacre". The others would have been wiser not doing so. The book puts a new light on Trenton with the account of Washington charging the manned cannon which could have caused the attack to have been a disaster for the Americans. Remember in "The Crossing" when Mercer told George Washington that there had been *no* American casualties? Wm. Washington was wounded at Trenton. At the occasion of the "launching" of Haller's book, I gave a guided tours of the battlefield (as I will be doing today) and Haller was in one of the groups. The viewpoint that I present is substantially that of Larry Babits in "Devil of a Whipping". I never learned his reaction to my presentation because we were interrupted just as he started to tell me and never got back to it. Haller's book was written as a thesis some time ago, but was revised for publication. He noted "Devil of a Whipping" as the newest and most comprehensive analysis of the Cowpens Battle, but I noted that Haller's information on the battle was more consistent with the older conventional histories of the battle. This may be more the result of the thesis having been written before the release of Babits book (1998). But he may have just been "playing it safe" by not endorsing Babits' significant revisions to the battle account. I noted, in particular, that he doesn't mention that Morgan had a head-count of over 2000 men on the day of the battle (compared to the 980 shown in conventional accounts). I recommend the book, not for insights provided about Cowpens (well-told elsewhere), but for Washington's overall contribution, not well-told previously. John Robertson